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We evaluate the effects of higher beer prices on gonorrhea, chlamydia, and teen 
pregnancy rates by pooling data across Canadian provinces over time. Higher real beer 
prices are significantly correlated with a reduction in both gonorrhea and chlamydia rates 
with price elasticities ranging from -0.6 to -1.4. In contrast, an increase in the minimum 
legal drinking age is significantly associated with a reduction in teen pregnancies as well 
as births. Finally, Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates from the 1996 National 
Population Health Surveys (NPHS) validate that increased alcohol consumption is 
correlated with risky sexual practices, and ultimately with an increased likelihood of 
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I. Introduction 
While possessing obvious benefits, sexual activity can also result in significant 
societal costs. Specifically, sex without proper protection can ultimately lead to an 
increase in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and therefore considerable 
health treatment costs.
1 However, other non-treatment costs might be even larger in 
magnitude. For example, children born to teenage mothers have lower birth weights.
2 
Further, as pointed out by Dryburgh (2001), pregnant teens themselves are also at greater 
risk of health problems.
3  
However, the costs of sexual activity are not exclusively health related. Teen 
parenting is correlated with delayed educational attainment as well as reduced labor 
market opportunities.
4 Further, children born to teenage mothers are more likely to 
perform poorly in school, and are at greater risk of abuse and neglect.
 5 Hence, 
understanding the effects of policies that might reduce unsafe sex or alternatively, 
encourage safer and more responsible practice, assumes enhanced importance. 
In this respect, economists have conducted a considerable amount of empirical 
research aimed at evaluating the efficacy of a variety of alcohol policies and regulations 
on STDs and teen childbearing. The intuition, of course, is that a decrease in alcohol 
                                                 
1 For example, U.S. estimates of the costs of chlamydia and associated complications in 1994 are US$2 
billion (Institute of Medicine, 1996). Frank (1996) reports that the annual costs of treating AIDS patients 
have been estimated at over CD$200 million in Canada (Frank, 1996). However, as noted by Patrick 
(1996), “Such costs for health care and related expenditures do not begin to approximate the costs in lost 
income and productivity associated with AIDS or the consequence of other STD.” 
 
2 Wolfe and Perozek (1997) and Health Canada (1999). 
 
3 For example, anemia, hypertension, renal disease, eclampsia and depressive disorders. Please see 
Combes-Orme (1993) and Turner et al. (1990) for further details. 
 
4 The Alan Guttmacher Institute (1999) and Coté (1994). 
 
5 Maynard (1996) and George and Lee (1997).    3
consumption should result in less risky sexual behavior, and therefore a reduction in 
STDs and teen pregnancies. This paper attempts to contribute to the existing literature by 
employing Canadian data to evaluate the effects of beer prices on teen pregnancies and 
STDs across all ages. This is accomplished by exploiting variation in: teen pregnancy and 
birth rates and gonorrhea rates for all ages across provinces and over time between 1980 
and 1998 and corresponding provincial chlamydia rates from 1991 to 1998.  
Such an exercise has obvious benefits from the perspective of Canadian policy. 
However, there are wider applications. First, given that most research has been 
exclusively confined to the analysis of U.S. policies, the evaluation of similar Canadian 
regulatory measures is a useful counterfactual analysis in terms of understanding the 
efficacy of a variety of policies from a different but comparable jurisdiction. The merits 
of such research are enhanced by the fact, that while the United States does have the 
highest rates of teen pregnancy and STDs among western countries, the decline in STD 
rates and teen childbearing in Canada has also been comparable, with teen pregnancies 
dropping by roughly 16% and gonorrhea rates falling by approximately 93% from the 
early nineteen-eighties to the late nineteen-nineties.   
Second, different studies using U.S. data arrive at varying conclusions regarding 
the efficacy of beer or alcohol taxes. Specifically, while Chesson et al. (2000) obtain 
rather large implied tax effects with respect to state level gonorrhea and syphilis rates, 
Carpenter (2000) finds beer taxes to be insignificantly correlated with youth gonorrhea 
rates. On the other hand, using comparable data, Grossman, Kaestner, and Markowitz 
(2004) find higher beer taxes to be significantly associated with a reduction in male   4
gonorrhea rates. The use of Canadian data across a reasonable number of jurisdictions 
and a relatively long time period should be useful in resolving these ambiguities. 
Third, employing Canadian data is also a contribution with respect to the 
literature on teen fertility and alcohol policies. Specifically, our enquiries with the 
National Centre of Vital Statistics suggest that U.S. data on teen births and pregnancies 
are only available for a limited number of years. In contrast, information on province 
specific births and pregnancies in Canada are available from the late nineteen-seventies 
onwards.  
Fourth, it might also be the case that the conflicting results of previous studies 
reflect the effects of unobserved state specific policies and/or factors such as the increase 
in the use of contraceptives and improvements in birth control methods witnessed over 
the same time period. In this respect, employing cross province time-series Canadian data 
allows us to control for the impacts of policies or initiatives or policies that are specific to 
time or jurisdiction or trending within jurisdictions through time with the help of two-
way fixed effects and province specific linear and quadratic trends.  
  Another contribution from the use of Canadian data stems from the reliance of 
U.S. studies on excise beer taxes. This empirical strategy makes sense from a reduced 
form perspective as higher taxes should result in higher prices and therefore less 
consumption. However, we argue that a better methodology is to match STD and 
pregnancy rates to beer prices instead of taxes. As pointed out by Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz (2002), economic theory suggests that prices rather than taxes directly impacts 
individual choice and hence better reflects alcohol costs. Another reason, of course, is 
that excise taxes might reflect unobserved state specific attitudes or attributes and thus   5
lead to unreliable inferences on the efficacy of alcohol regulation. The traditional 
emphasis of U.S. studies on beer taxes rather than prices can probably be explained by 
the difficulties associated with obtaining such data across states and over a relatively long 
time period. In comparison, data on provincial Canadian beer and alcohol prices are 
available from the nineteen-seventies onwards.        
Finally, we attempt to identify the effects of alcohol consumption on STDs by 
exploiting available data from the 1996 wave of the National Population Health Surveys 
(NPHS). A plausible relationship between higher alcohol taxes and the incidence of 
sexually transmitted diseases is predicated on a positive correlation between STDs, risky 
behavior, and alcohol consumption. A resulting contribution from this analysis is our 
attempt to evaluate the effects of increased alcohol consumption on risky sexual practices 
– as measured through having multiple partners within the past year – while including 
other covariates intended at capturing individual risk-taking behavior (breaking speed 
limits, not wearing a seatbelt, drinking and driving, daily smoker for a number of years).  
This is an important as previous studies have emphasized that coefficient 
estimates of the effects of individual alcohol consumption with respect to risky sexual 
practices such as having sex without a condom and possessing multiple sexual partners 
might reflect individual proclivities for risk-taking rather than true causal impacts. But 
the more unique contribution results from the data allowing us to correlate changes in 
alcohol consumption to risky sexual practices as well as to the probability of having a 
sexually transmitted disease. We employ Instrumental Variables (IV) to specifically 
estimate the effects of alcohol consumption on the likelihood of having multiple partners 
through first stage regressions and the impacts of subsequently identified sexual practices   6
on the probability of having a STD through second-stage regressions. This methodology 
follows the causal pathways suggested by epidemiologists. To the best of our knowledge, 
other studies have been unable to achieve this is because of a lack of similar data. 
Our findings suggest higher beer prices do result in lower STD rates and price 
elasticities within a range of –0.6 to –1.4. While real beer prices have no impact on teen 
pregnancy and birth rates, an increase in the minimum legal drinking age from 18 to 19 
years does have a negative impact. Our estimates from the 1996 wave of the National 
Population Health Surveys (NPHS) confirm that higher alcohol consumption is 
significantly correlated with an increase in the likelihood of risky sexual practices and 
more importantly, coefficient estimates of the impact of alcohol consumption remain 
statistically significant and relatively unchanged in magnitude with the inclusion of other 
covariates intended at controlling for risk taking behaviour. Specifically, having 10 
drinks a day on average results in roughly a 60% increase in the probability of possessing 
multiple partners within the past year. Finally, having multiple partners is correlated with 
roughly a 2% increase in the likelihood of having a STD.  
The reminder of our paper is structured as follows. The next section consists of an 
overview of the literature. Section 3 presents data trends. The empirical model is 
presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses our econometric estimates. Finally, section 6 
concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
II. Background Literature 
a. STDs, teen pregnancies, and beer taxes 
Recent research by economists suggests that more stringent alcohol control 
policies result in positive externalities in terms of leading to lower STD rates. In a   7
seminal paper, Chesson et al. (2000) find that increased beer taxes significantly reduce 
STD rates among the overall population, implying that higher alcohol taxes are a 
particularly powerful deterrent to risky sexual behavior. Specifically, employing cross-
state data from 1981 to 1995, they find a $1 increase in the per-gallon beer tax to be 
correlated with 25.4% and 93.3% reduction in all-age gonorrhea and syphilis rates, 
respectively. In addition, the authors find that a one year increase in the minimum legal 
age is associated with between a 6.5-8% fall in gonorrhea rates among 15-19 year olds.  
Grossman, Kaestner, and Markowitz (2004b) focus on the effects of beer taxes on 
gonorrhea rates among 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 year olds across states from 1981 to 2001. 
They also estimate the impact of beer taxes on AIDS rates across Municipal Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) over the same time period. Interestingly, they do not control for variation 
in the minimum legal drinking age. Their results suggest that higher beer taxes and the 
presence of zero tolerance laws are associated with reductions in the male youth 
gonorrhea rates. More importantly, their estimates suggest elasticities within a plausible 
interval of between -0.3 and -0.5.  
Carpenter (2004) estimates the effects of zero-tolerance drunk driving laws on 
state level gonorrhea rates between 1981 to 2000. His results suggest that the enactment 
of such laws is correlated with a reduction in gonorrhea rates among white males in the 
15 to 19 years age group. In most cases, coefficient estimates of the effects of an increase 
in beer taxes and the minimum legal drinking age are statistically insignificant. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers that specifically focus on 
the effects of alcohol control policies on teen childbearing. Employing state level data 
from 1975 to 1992, Dee (2001) finds that higher minimum legal drinking ages have a   8
negative effect on teen motherhood rates among black adolescents, but not among white 
adolescents. However, he does not control for beer taxes. On the other hand, Sen (2003) 
uses state-level data from four years (1985, 1988, 1992, and 1996) to investigate the 
effects of beer taxes on teen birth and abortion rates, but does not control for differences 
in the minimum legal drinking age. Her results suggest that an increase in beer taxes have 
no effects on teen birthrates, and very small negative effects on teen abortion rates, with 
the latter result being sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects. Further, her reliance 
on only four years of data is unsurprising given that our correspondence with the U.S. 
National Centre of Vital Statistics confirms that data on teen births and pregnancies are 
only available for a limited number of years.
6 
The above discussion underscores the merits of employing Canadian data in order 
to investigate the effects of higher beer taxes and an increase in the minimum legal 
drinking age on STDs and teen pregnancies. First, all previous research has been 
exclusively conducted with U.S. data. Hence, evidence on the corresponding effects of 
similar alcohol regulation from a comparable jurisdiction should be of interest. This is all 
the more relevant, given the comparable declines in STDs and teen pregnancies 
witnessed in Canada over the same time period.  
Second, very few studies have simultaneously controlled for changes in beer taxes 
as well as in the minimum legal drinking age in evaluating the impacts of alcohol control 
policies on either STDs or teen pregnancies. Third, the findings of previous studies are 
ambiguous with some finding a significant correlation between higher beer taxes and 
lower STDs/teen pregnancies while others obtain contrary results. These estimates might 
                                                 
6 The lack of data over a long time period probably explains why Dee (2001) constructs teen birth and 
pregnancy rates from secondary sources.    9
in fact, be an artifact of unobserved state-specific attitudes and attributes rather than 
changes in beer taxes reflecting true causal impacts.
7 Similarly, there exists conflicting 
evidence on the effects of an increase in the minimum legal drinking age. Fourth, unlike 
corresponding U.S. data, Canadian information on teen births and pregnancies is 
available over a much longer time span, allowing us to better identify the true impacts of 
alcohol control policies. 
Finally, instead of exclusively relying on variation in beer taxes, we match annual 
changes in beer prices to corresponding shifts in STDs and teen pregnancies, which is 
consistent with economic theory and a better methodology if the objective is to evaluate 
whether making alcohol more expensive has significant impacts. Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz (2002) suggest that most papers that have studied the impacts of alcohol 
consumption, use beer or some variant of alcohol taxes instead of price data collected by 
the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) because of: (1) 
changes in definition of alcohol over time; (2) and significant gaps in information across 
states and over time.
8  
However, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) point to problems from using 
beer tax data also. Specifically, using multivariate regression analysis, they find beer 
taxes to be poor predictors of corresponding variation in prices. Further, beer taxes only 
constitute a small portion of total beer prices. And as mentioned above, other research 
                                                 
7 This concern assumes particular relevance given the findings by Dee (1999). Specifically, most studies on 
the effectiveness of drunk-driving legislation enacted in the U.S. during the nineteen-eighties and early 
nineties suggest that higher beer taxes are an effective mechanism to deter drinking and driving (e.g., 
Chaloupka et al., 1993). However, Dee (1999) demonstrates that beer taxes in fact, become statistically 
insignificant over a longer time period with the inclusion of state fixed effects, suggesting that the results of 
previous research may be confounded due to the inability to disentangle the impact of higher beer taxes 
from other state specific characteristics.   
  
8 Beer tax data are available from the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States.   10
focused on evaluating the determinants of harmful consequences of alcohol consumption 
such as impaired driving, find beer taxes to reflect unobserved state specific 
characteristics rather than true causal impacts. For these reasons, we believe that using 
beer prices constitutes a more refined empirical strategy that employing taxes and is a 
contribution from the use of Canadian data. 
b. STDs and alcohol consumption 
Our research also attempts to contribute to the literature by identifying the effects 
of alcohol consumption on STDs. This is accomplished by exploiting the 1996 wave of 
the National Population Health Surveys (NPHS). From the simplest perspective, available 
data from this survey allows us to conduct a counterfactual analysis by verifying whether 
an increase in alcohol consumption, on average, results in an enhanced likelihood of 
participating in risky sexual activities (such as multiple sexual partners over a limited 
time period), which then increases the probability of having a STD. While this is a 
relatively straightforward exercise, it is important, as to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has simultaneously evaluated the impact of greater alcohol consumption on risky 
sexual practices and the effects of such behavior on the likelihood of having a STD. The 
closest to such an exercise is Grossman, Kaestner, and Markowitz (2004a) who employ 
three waves of the 1997 National Longitudinal Youth Survey and biennial waves of the 
Youth Risk Behavioral Surveys, and find that while alcohol consumption shares a 
statistically insignificant relationship with the probability of having sex, it does seem to 
lower contraceptive use among sexually active teens.  
The other, perhaps more important objective is to cleanly identify the impacts of 
alcohol consumption on the prevalence of STDs. Specifically, the existence of a negative   11
correlation between beer taxes and STDs is premised on the assumption that enhanced 
alcohol consumption increases the likelihood of risky behavior, or conversely reduces the 
precautionary care an individual might otherwise exhibit.
9 Hence, an increase in beer 
taxes should lead to lower STDs by first resulting in a decline in alcohol consumption. 
However, simply regressing measures of STD prevalence or risky sexual practices 
on alcohol consumption might result in biased and confounded estimates of the true 
relationship between them. This is because both alcohol consumption and participation in 
risky sexual practices might be driven by an underlying proclivity for high-risk behavior. 
The key challenge then, is to separate the unobserved effects of general risk taking 
behavior from admitted alcohol consumption, in order to obtain a robust and reliable 
estimate of the impacts of alcohol on risky sexual practices.
10  
Grossman, Kaestner, and Markowitz (2004a) address this problem by using 
instruments that only vary by state and year but not by individual. As pointed out by 
Rashad and Kaestner (2004) such an empirical strategy possesses some shortcomings. 
We adapt a slightly different and simpler methodology, which again is made possible by 
the unique information available from the NPHS survey. Specifically, when estimating 
the effects of alcohol consumption on risky sexual practices, we construct and include 
covariates for self-reported drinking and driving, speeding, and smoking. Such behavior 
are obvious and plausible measures for risk-taking and their inclusion should be helpful 
in mitigating any bias in coefficient estimates of the effects of alcohol consumption. 
 
                                                 
9 Please see Chesson et al. (2000) and Sen (2003) for excellent reviews of this literature. 
 
10 In related work, Sen (2002) and Rees et al. (2001) examine the link between alcohol use and adolescent 
sexual activity. 
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III. Trends in Gonorrhea, Chlamydia, and Teen Pregnancies   
Gonorrhea is a sexually transmitted disease that affects both men and women, and 
can be transmitted through oral, vaginal and anal sex. Gonorrhea can be passed on to a 
newborn during birth and cause eye infections or blindness. If left untreated, gonorrhea 
can cause serious complications including pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in women 
and infertility for both sexes.
11  
Chlamydia can also be transmitted through vaginal, anal and oral sex and can be 
transmitted from mother to child during childbirth.
12 Untreated chlamydia among women 
can lead to pelvic inflammatory disease (PID). Babies born to pregnant women with 
Chlamydia may be premature, have eye infections or develop pneumonia. Men can 
develop scarring of the urethra, making urination difficult and occasionally causing 
infertility. Although rare, both sexes are at risk of a type of arthritis known as Reiter's 
Syndrome - an inflammation and swelling caused by the spread of the infection through 
the bloodstream into the joints. Both gonorrhea and Chlamydia can be treated through 
antibiotics.  
                                                 
11 For women, symptoms may include: new or different discharge from the vagina; burning sensation 
during urination; pain in the lower abdomen; fever; chills; pain during sex; vaginal bleeding between 
periods or after intercourse; and rectal pain and/or discharge. Males who have symptoms may experience: 
yellow-green discharge from the penis; burning feeling when urinating; pain or swelling of the testicles; 
and rectal pain and/or discharge. This description has been taken from Health Canada, specifically 
available at: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/std-mts/ud-gonorrhea-200503_e.html.  
 
12 Symptoms of infection for women can include: vaginal discharge; a burning sensation when urinating; 
pain in the lower abdomen, sometimes with fever and chills; pain during sex; vaginal bleeding between 
periods or after intercourse.  Symptoms for men can include: discharge from the penis; burning sensation 
when urinating; burning or itching at the opening of the penis; pain and/or swelling in the testicles; and 
rectal pain, bleeding and discharge. This description has been taken from http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/iyh-
vsv/diseases-maladies/chlamyd_e.html.    13
The United States has the highest STD and teen pregnancy rates among western 
industrializes nations.
13 Although the prevalence of STDs and teen pregnancies are much 
lower in Canada, it is interesting to note the existence of some patterns over time. For 
example, the nineteen-eighties and nineties witnessed a sharp decline in gonorrhea rates 
in both Canada and the Unite States. Specifically, as demonstrated in figure 1, gonorrhea 
rates per 100,000 of population fell by roughly 93% and 70% in Canada and the U.S., 
respectively, from 1981 to 1999.
14 What is perhaps, more interesting and relevant is that 
these movements are more or less parallel over this time period. On the other hand, trends 
in chlamydia rates are quite dissimilar, with Canada witnessing a decline of 
approximately 28% and corresponding rates in the U.S. trending upwards (figure 2). This 
is intriguing given that rates in the two countries were virtually identical in 1991. 
In contrast, there are similarities in trends in teen pregnancies as well as births 
(per 1,000 of female teens) over time. Employing comparable U.S. data (from 1986) from 
the Alan Gutmacher Institute, figure 3 suggests that teen pregnancies started increasing in 
the U.S. during the late nineteen-eighties and early nineties but then began declining.
15 In 
comparison, while teen pregnancies in Canada began increasing around the same time, 
the corresponding drop occurred sometime later, roughly during the mid nineteen-
nineties. In summary, these figures suggest that movements in gonorrhea rates as well as 
teen pregnancies and births have been similar in Canada and the U.S., and therefore an 
                                                 
13 http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_teens.html. 
 
14 Data on Canadian gonorrhea and Chlamydia rates are available at http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/00vol26/26s6/. Information on corresponding U.S. rates can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/std/stats01/tables/table1.htm. 
 
15 Canadian data on teen pregnancies were obtained from Statistics Canada. U.S. rates are available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/state_pregnancy_trends.pdf.   14
evaluation of the determinants of gonorrhea and teen pregnancy and birth rates in Canada 
might be useful to U.S. policymakers as well. 
The question is then whether alcohol control policies have been responsible for 
the decline in Canadian gonorrhea and chlamydia rates and teen births and pregnancies. 
Statistics Canada data suggest that beer prices certainly become higher over the sample 
period– specifically, increasing by roughly 10% between 1980 and 1999. Coupled along 
with the observed 93% and 28% decline in gonorrhea and Chlamydia rates, these figures 
denote crude and rather large price elasticities of -9 and -3, respectively. The relevant 
point of course, is whether similar estimates are obtainable from a more rigorous 
empirical methodology. 
The relevance of beer prices stems from the use of beer taxes as a fiscal policy 
instrument. In this respect, there exists considerable variation in the Provincial Sales Tax 
(PST) across jurisdictions and over time.
16 Available data from 1986 to 1999 shows that 
British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland increased its PST from: 7 
to 10%; 6 to 7%; 10 to 15%; and 12 to 15%, respectively. With respect to the other 
provinces: Alberta did not impose any PST; Saskatchewan reduced its PST from 10 to 
7%; Quebec dropped its corresponding tax from 9 to 7.5%; and finally, Prince Edward 
Island remained constant at 10%.
17 
The other policy instrument of key relevance is the minimum legal drinking age. 
In this respect, the variation is chiefly cross-province, as only Prince Edward Island 
increased its minimum legal drinking age during the sample period (from 18 to 19 in 
                                                 
16 We ignore variation in federal levies over time as these are common to all provinces. 
17 Tax data were obtained from the Brewers Association of Canada.   15
1988). Specifically, Quebec, Manitoba, and Alberta had a legal drinking age of 18 while 
the other provinces had a corresponding regulated age of 19.  
In conclusion, there seems to have been pronounced province-specific trends 
among a wide array of alcohol control initiatives. The next section attempts to 
disentangle the impacts of each of these policies within a more rigorous econometric 
framework.            
  IV. Empirical Results 
a.  Cross- Province and Time-Series Results- STDs 
This section sets an empirical baseline for evaluating the impacts of beer taxes and 
the minimum legal drinking age on gonorrhea rates employing province specific data 
from 1981 to 1999, and on Chlamydia rates between 1991 and 1999. In this respect, the 
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STDit denotes the specific sexually transmitted disease, RBEERPit proxies real 
beer prices, MINDUMit is a dummy that is 1 if a province has a minimum legal drinking 
age of 19 years and is zero otherwise, STDit (-1) is the lagged dependent variable that 
captures the underlying mechanism of transmission of these diseases (Chesson et al. 
2000), and PCIit is real per capita income while UNEMPit is the provincial 
unemployment rate, both of which are intended at capturing business cycle effects. 
                                                 
18 The use of a level approach is validated by results from Likelihood Ratio tests based on Box-Cox 
regressions that do not reject the use of a levels specification. 
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Finally, Pi are province fixed effects, Yt are year fixed effects, Tit consists of province 
specific linear trends, 
2
it T are province specific quadratic trends, and it ε  is the error term.
 
19 Summary statistics and data sources of all variables are contained in table 1. 
  Table 2 consists of OLS estimates of equation (1) with respect to gonorrhea rates 
with the standard errors of all covariates being White and Newey-West corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation. Panels A, B, and C contain empirical 
estimates of the effects of real beer prices and the minimum legal drinking age on total, 
male and female gonorrhea rates, respectively. Column 1 consists of the base 
specification and controls for the effects of real beer prices, per capita income, 
unemployment rates, province and year fixed effects, and finally, province specific linear 
trends. Province specific quadratic trends are added in column 2 while the effects of the 
minimum legal drinking age are evaluated in column 3. Finally, column 4 conducts a 
sensitivity analysis by adding variables that have also significantly trended over time.  
  The possibility of beer prices reflecting the impact of other unobserved initiatives 
or policies should be mitigated by our use of province specific linear and quadratic 
trends. Nonetheless, we include measures for medical care such as real per capita health 
expenditures and the number of per capita physicians that can plausibly impact 
movements in STDs and teen pregnancies, and have also significantly changed over time 
and varied across provinces. Further, we include a covariate for cigarette prices, which 
experienced significant changes over time and across provinces over the sample period. 
Specifically, roughly a 50% tax cut was imposed in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, 
                                                 
19 It is also important to acknowledge the possible impacts of impaired driving laws. Carpenter (2005) 
emphasizes the effects such legislation have had in reducing certain gonorrhea rates. However, given that 
most legislative changes in Canada were enacted in the nineteen-seventies and eighties (Sen, 2001) we rely 
on linear and quadratic trends rather than explicit covariates.    17
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island by both federal and provincial governments in 
February nineteen ninety-four. The corresponding decline in cigarettes taxes in other 
provinces was much lower.
 20  
       The first important result is the statistically significant and negative coefficient 
estimate of real beer prices across all columns and panels in table 2. Unsurprisingly, there 
is variation in the magnitude of coefficient estimates across columns. Specifically, the 
implied beer price elasticity in panel A increases from -0.776 to -0.905 between columns 
1 to 4. Similarly, the implied beer price elasticity with respect to males (panel B) 
increases from -0.803 to -0.876. In contrast, the corresponding increase for females 
(panel C) is more pronounced, from -0.679 to -0.843. In summary: (1) an increase in real 
beer prices is robustly correlated with a decline in gonorrhea rates (2) further, there does 
not seem to be a significant difference in price elasticities across gender. 
  In terms of other important results, coefficient estimates of the minimum legal 
drinking age are in most cases positive and statistically insignificant. Unsurprisingly, the 
lagged gonorrhea rate is positive and statistically significant across all columns. 
However, it is also important to note the considerable decline in coefficient estimates 
across all columns and panels, highlighting the importance of using a well specified 
model, as coefficient estimates of lagged gonorrhea rates may otherwise simply reflect 
the impacts of other unobserved determinants.  
Table 3 consists of OLS estimates of the effects of real beer prices on chlamydia 
rates per 100,000 of population between 1991 and 1999. Similar to table 2, panels A, B, 
and C consist of econometric estimates with respect to total, male, and female chlamydia 
                                                 
20 In 1993 the mean tax per carton in the other provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, and Newfoundland) was $37. In the next year it had declined to $31.   18
rates, respectively. Column 1 consists of the baseline estimates and apart from beer 
prices, specifically contains the lagged Chlamydia rate, province and year fixed effects, 
and province linear trends. Column 2 adds the unemployment rate and per capita income. 
Finally, column 3 includes province specific quadratic trends.
21 
Empirical estimates are remarkably similar across panels and columns. First, beer 
prices are negative and statistically significant across all columns with results in column 
3 specifically implying a price elasticity of -1.14. Interestingly, the corresponding 
estimates from column 3 in panels B and C imply that males are more price elastic (-
1.4015) than females (-0.9665). In this respect these results are slightly different than the 
previous estimates with respect to gonorrhea rates but they are consistent in the sense that 
an increase in prices is significantly correlated with a decrease in the STD rate in 
question. Further, as in the case of gonorrhea rates, lagged chlamydia rates are 
statistically significant but possess negative coefficients.  
A key thesis of this paper is that the use of real beer prices is better than 
employing changes in tax rates in order to evaluate whether making alcohol more 
expensive ultimately results in lower STD rates through a decline in consumption. The 
reasons for this are obvious. Real beer prices change for a variety of reasons other than 
changes to tax rates. Hence matching trends in STD rates to changes in taxes may result 
in underestimates of the true impacts of more expensive alcohol. Further, as discussed 
earlier, coefficient estimates of beer taxes might reflect unobserved state specific 
attributes or sentiments rather than true causal impacts.  
                                                 
21 Due to the smaller sample size relative to gonorrhea rates, the minimum legal drinking age had to be 
excluded in order to accommodate province specific fixed effects. 
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In order to investigate this possibility, table 4 consists of estimates of changes in 
the provincial sales tax for beer (converted in $ per litre) on gonorrhea and chlamydia 
rates. Panels A and B consist of estimates with respect to gonorrhea and chlamydia, 
respectively. Column 1 contains estimates with respect to the total rate while columns 2 
and 3 focus on males and females separately. While beer taxes are sporadically 
significant with respect to gonorrhea rates, they possess counter-intuitive positive signs. 
On the other hand, beer taxes are statistically significant with respect to chlamydia rates. 
However, the coefficient estimates are much larger in magnitude than corresponding 
results from table 3 and suggest elasticities of between -3 and -8.66, which seem rather 
large and less plausible. These results illustrate the benefits of relying on actual variation 
in real beer prices as opposed to taxes 
In summary, our results suggest that higher beer prices are significantly correlated 
with a reduction in STD rates. However, from the perspective of fiscal policy, it is 
important to ascertain whether an increase in the provincial sales tax will result in higher 
alcohol prices. Hence, employing the above cross-province time-series we ran a simple 
empirical specification motivated by other studies that have analyzed the effects of tax 
changes on prices. Specifically, we regressed the natural logarithm of provincial sales tax 
($ per litre) on the natural logarithm of real beer prices per litre and also employed 
province and year fixed effects, province specific linear trends, and the natural logarithms 
of unemployment rates and per capita income. Simple OLS (with standard errors White 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and Newey-West corrected for autocorrelation) yield the 
following results; 
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ln (real beer prices) = intercept + 0.81147 ln(tax) + 0.093828 ln (unemployment 
rate) - 0.01294 ln (per capita income) +  province and year fixed effects + province linear 
trends 
      adjusted R Square = 0.9480 
  
Hence, a 1% increase in real taxes is significantly (at 5%) correlated with a 0.81% 
increase in real per litre beer prices. These results confirm that an increase in prices 
generated by higher taxes should result in lower STD rates. 
b. IV results - STDs 
As noted by Grossman, Kaestner, and Markowitz (2004b), using lagged 
dependent variables on the right hand side might result in some problems. Specifically, 
Baltagi (2001) has pointed out that coefficient estimates of lagged dependent variables in 
fixed effects models might be inconsistent even in the absence of autocorrelation, thus 
impacting coefficient estimates of other covariates that are correlated with the lagged 
dependent variables. In order to remedy this we use Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimation, the results of which are presented in table 5.   
Panels A and B contain estimates with respect to gonorrhea and chlamydia rates, 
respectively. Columns 1, 3, and 5 consist of first stage regression results where the lagged 
STD rate is specifically instrumented by the lagged value of ad valorem or provincial 
sales tax on beer consumption, converted in dollar terms as well as interactions of the 
lagged value of this tax variable with dummy variables representing the political party in 
power in a province. Specifically, we construct two dummy variables each of which 
assumes a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the political party it represents is in power in a   21
province. In this respect, there is one dummy variable each for the Liberal Party and the 




24 The distinction between the columns is that 1 consists of estimates with 
respect to total STD rates and columns 3 and 5 look at males and females, respectively. 
Corresponding second stage regression results for total, male, and female STD rates are 
contained in columns 2, 4, and 6. 
Constructing instruments based on the political party in power in addition to 
lagged taxes enables us to construct a test for overidentifying restrictions. By interacting 
the lagged values of provincial sales taxes (in dollars) with the political party in power, 
we are attempting to ascertain whether changes in taxes can be identified with changes in 
provincial governments. This is intuitively plausible. Further, these instruments should 
not be directly correlated with the right hand side error term. 
  Empirical estimates from panel A of columns 1, 3, 5 reveal that changes in lagged 
beer taxes are negatively correlated with corresponding changes in lagged total, male, and 
female gonorrhea rates. However, coefficient estimates of lagged beer taxes are 
statistically insignificant. The only instrument which is significant is Lagged Beer Tax (in 
$) * New Democratic Party or the interaction of lagged beer taxes with the New 
Democratic Party, in columns 1 and 3. Further, employing F tests of joint significance, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates of the instruments are 
                                                 
22 Along with the Conservative Party these are the national political parties in Canada. The Conservatives 
are considered right wing and the Liberals and the New Democratic Party left wing, with the New 
Democrats considered to be further left than the Liberals. Other parties are smaller and regionally based. 
 
23 For example, if the average real beer price per litre in a province for a given year is $10 and the sales tax 
is 5%, then the corresponding dollar component of price is $0.50. 
 
24 Our sample size is restricted to 1986-1999 due to data availability on political parties.  
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equal to zero. Therefore, the results from the second stage regressions must be treated 
with caution.
25  However, it is reassuring that coefficient estimates of real beer prices 
from columns 1, 3, and 5 are negative and are not that dissimilar in terms of implied 
elasticities from table 3. 
On the other hand, empirical estimates from first stage regressions with respect to 
chlamydia rates (columns 1, 3, and 5 from panel B) are quite different. Specifically, while 
the interactions of lagged taxes with different political parties are statistically 
insignificant, coefficient estimates of lagged beer taxes are statistically significant across 
all columns. Further, p values from F tests of joint significance are very low, allowing us 
to comfortably reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient estimates of the instruments 
equaling zero, across all columns. Finally, we perform a test of overidentifying 
restrictions as suggested by Hansen (1982).
26 The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the 
instruments cannot be rejected (p  > 0.10)). 
  Second stage regression results in columns 2, 4, and 6 with respect to chlamydia 
demonstrate that coefficient estimates of real beer prices are statistically significant and 
more importantly implied elasticities that are slightly larger than but in line with 
corresponding OLS estimates from table 3. In summary, OLS estimates derived from 
                                                 
25 As pointed out by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997), IV coefficient 
estimates will be inconsistent and biased if instruments are only weakly correlated with 
potential simultaneously determined variables. 
 
26 The test statistic is given by O = s
2(Z′e)′(Z′Z)
-1(Z′e), where Z is the matrix of instruments, e is the vector 
of error terms from the second-stage IV estimation routine and s
2 is the estimated variance of the error 
terms from this regression. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments, O is distributed χ
2 
with degrees of freedom given by the number of overidentifying restrictions (J +1), where J is the number 
of endogenous variables.   23
employing a wide array of covariates, province and year fixed effects, province specific 
linear and quadratic trends consistently imply that an increase in real beer prices is 
significantly correlated with a reduction in gonorrhea as well as chlamydia rates. 
Corresponding IV estimates are consistent with OLS results in the sense of possessing 
negative coefficients, and in most cases, denoting comparable elasticities.  
c.  Cross- Province and Time-Series Results- Teen Births and Pregnancies 
OLS (1981-1999) and IV (1986-1999) estimates of the impacts of increases in real 
beer prices and the minimum legal drinking age on teen pregnancies and birth rates 
derived from cross-province time-series data are presented in table 6.
27 There are of 
course, some differences in the empirical specification relative to the one employed for 
the analysis on STDs, and which are consistent with the specific literature on teen 
pregnancies.
28 First, there is no lagged dependent variable. Second, consistent with the 
relevant literature, we include a variable that represents average government transfers to 
female lone parent families as a number of studies have found a correlation between teen 
pregnancies and welfare payments.
29 Third, while we estimate the contemporaneous 
effects of real beer prices, the minimum legal drinking age, and average government 
transfers on teen pregnancies, only the effects of lagged versions of these covariates are 
estimated on teen births, given the gestation period from pregnancy to birth. Finally, 
taking into consideration the limited time-series variation in teen pregnancies and births 
over time, we do not use province specific quadratic trends, and instead rely on province 
                                                 
27 The rates are specifically for females under the age of 20 per 1,000 of respective population.  
 
28 Dee (2001) and Sen (2003). 
 
29 Examples include but are not restricted to Levine (1995) and Lundberg (1996). 
   24
and year fixed effects and province specific linear trends to control for the confounding 
effects of unobserved determinants.  
     Panel A of table 6 consists of empirical estimates with respect to teen 
pregnancies while panel B contains corresponding estimates for teen births. Columns 1 
and 2 consist of OLS estimates, with the difference between the columns stemming from 
the inclusion of province specific linear trends in column 2. Corresponding IV estimates 
are contained in columns 3 and 4, with the difference again being the inclusion of 
province specific linear trends in column 4. The only covariate instrumented is average 
government transfers to female lone parent families, specifically by political dummy 
variables (Liberal Party and New Democrat Party). Of course, only the lagged versions of 
these instruments are employed when estimating the effects of lagged transfers on teen 
births in panel B.  
The first result of importance is the statistical insignificance (in most cases) and 
positive signs of both OLS and IV coefficient estimates of real beer prices. Average 
transfers are statistically significant in panel A (teen pregnancies) in columns 3 and 4 but 
largely statistically imprecise in panel B (teen births). Of more interest is the consistently 
negative and statistically significant (in most cases) coefficient estimates of the minimum 
legal drinking age. Specifically, these coefficient estimates suggest that an increase in the 
minimum legal drinking age from 18 to 19 years is associated with between: (1) a to 
3.2924 to 9.0556 decline in teen pregnancies; and a (2) 2.8227 to 10.407 fall in teen 
births per 1,000 of relevant population.  
Considering that the implicit variation in the minimum legal drinking age variable 
(1-if 19, 0 if 18) is chiefly cross-province, it is quite possible that its statistical   25
significance is a result of other unobserved province specific initiatives rather than true 
causal impacts. However, it is also quite plausible that enhanced difficulties associated 
with accessing alcohol teen pregnancies in provinces with a higher legal drinking age               
and births could result in lower teen pregnancies and births. As noted, these results are 
consistent with comparable estimates obtained by Dee (2001) with respect to cross-state 
and time-series U.S. data. In terms of the general statistical insignificance of real beer 
prices, it is also worthwhile to emphasize that Sen (2003) also did not find beer prices to 
share a consistently significant relationship with either teen pregnancies or abortions.           
d. 1996 National Population Health Survey 
Table 8 contains estimates of the effects of alcohol consumption on whether an 
individual had more than one sexual partner in the past year and the impact of multiple 
partners on the likelihood of having a STD. The 1996 NPHS consists of over 80,000 
observations. In order to conduct our analysis we only kept individuals who confirmed 
that they had sexual intercourse at least once in the past year, are single, and are less than 
55 years of age, leaving us with a sample of 11,431 observations.  
Alcohol consumption is captured as the number of average daily drinks in the past 
year and the square of the number of daily drinks. In order to mitigate concerns that 
coefficient estimates of alcohol consumption might be capturing risk taking behavior, we 
include the following as covariates: number of years as daily smoker; number of years as 
daily smoker- squared; if the individual regularly breaks speed limits; and finally, the 
number of times the individual has driven after having too many drinks in the past year. 
We also include male, age, household income, education, and province fixed effects.
30 
                                                 
30 We construct education fixed effects for: high school; some college; college; some university; 
undergraduate; and graduate. Income fixed effects are: less than 5000; 5,000-9999; 10000-14999; 15000-  26
  Figure 5 gives the proportion of survey respondents according to arbitrary 
drinking thresholds. Table 7 consists of means according to the same alcohol 
consumption classification. Discounting the last column (having 10 or more drinks daily) 
which only consists of 29 survey respondents, there is a pronounced increase across 
columns and hence in the mean number of respondents that answer affirmatively to 
having multiple partners and STDs, offering evidence of a positive correlation between 
increased alcohol consumption, risky sexual partners (multiple partners), and having a 
STD. Similarly, the mean amount of years being a daily smoker increases with alcohol 
consumption. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents who answer affirmatively 
to breaking speed limits decreases with alcohol consumption.     
Panel A of table 8 consists of estimates with respect to all ages while B contains 
regressions with respect to teens. Otherwise both columns are organized similarly. 
Columns 1-3 consist of OLS estimates with having multiple partners (1-yes,0-no) as the 
dependent variable.
31  Column 1 consists of daily alcohol and daily alcohol consumption 
squared along with the different fixed effects. Column 2 evaluates the effects of adding 
breaking speed limits and the number of times the individual has driven impaired. 
Number of years as a daily smoker and its squared term are included in column 3. 
Column 4 consists of OLS estimates of the effects of possessing multiple partners on the 
likelihood of having a STD while corresponding IV estimates are in column 5, with 
possessing multiple partners being instrumented by breaking speed limits, number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
19999; 20000-29999; 30000-39999; 40-49999; 50-5999; 60-7999; and greater than 80000. Age fixed 
effects are for the following categories: 20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40-44; 45-49; and 50-54. The omitted 
category is 15-19 year olds.  
 
31 An individual has a STD if he/she suffers from any one or more of the following: chlamydia; gonorrhea; 
syphilis; genital warts; herpes; hepatitis; AIDS; pelvic inflammatory disease; any other.   27
times the individual has driven impaired, years as a daily smoker and number of years as 
a daily smoker squared.
32 
  The first result of importance is the fact that alcohol consumption is statistically 
significant with relatively little change in coefficient estimates across columns. In panel 
A, column 1, the coefficient estimate of alcohol consumption implies that individuals 
who consume 10 drinks on a daily basis are 70% more likely to have multiple partners. 
By column 3, the coefficient estimate drops slightly to 60%. Coefficient estimates of 
speeding and driving impaired are also statistically significant across columns 2 and 3. 
However, speeding possesses a counter-intuitive negative sign. On the other hand, one 
incident of impaired driving is roughly correlated with a 9% increase in the likelihood of 
having multiple partners. Similarly being a daily smoker is positively correlated with 
having multiple partners. Specifically, being a daily smoker for 10 years is associated 
with a 5% increase in the probability of multiple partners. Interestingly, the 
corresponding coefficient estimates with respect to teens (panel B) are not all that 
different from panel A. 
  In summary, most of the risk-taking covariates do possess the expected positive 
coefficients. But perhaps more importantly, their inclusion does not significantly impact 
empirical estimates of alcohol consumption. This gives us some confidence that our 
estimates accurately reflect the effects of alcohol consumption on risky sexual practices 
rather than unobserved behavior that is also correlated with alcohol consumption. 
  Finally, columns 4 and 5 consist of OLS and IV estimates, respectively, of the 
impacts of having multiple partners. Coefficient estimates of the effects of having 
                                                 
32 We specifically employ OLS as opposed to logistic or probit estimation because of the ease in 
conducting and comparing OLS and IV results. However, results from logistic regressions (in the absence 
of fixed effects ar equite similar to OLS estimates.    28
multiple partners are remarkably similar across panel as well as columns; specifically 
such behavior is positively correlated with a 2.4 to 2.8% increase in the probability of 
having a STD. The small magnitude of coefficient estimates is probably a result of 
underreporting among survey respondents, which is unsurprising when one considers the 
social stigma associated with having a STD.
33 Nonetheless, despite the small magnitude, 
it is still reassuring that we are able to obtain a positive correlation between STDs and 
having multiple partners. This result along with the positive association between alcohol 
consumption and possessing more than one partner adds credibility to our findings of a 
statistically precise relationship between higher beer taxes and lower STD rates.    
VI. Conclusion 
  We attempt to contribute to the literature by employing Canadian data to estimate 
the effects of beer prices on gonorrhea and chlamydia rates across provinces and over 
time from the nineteen-eighties and early nineteen-nineties onwards. Such an exercise is 
merited by the rather steep decline in both STD rates that occurred over the sample 
period and the conflicting results obtained by U.S. studies. Coincidentally, there was also 
considerable variation in ad valorem tax rates at the same time. A thesis of this paper is 
that matching beer prices to STD rates is probably a better empirical strategy than 
directly estimating the effects of beer taxes on STD rates as beer prices accurately reflect 
costs of alcohol consumption and previous studies have found beer taxes to reflect 
unobserved state specific characteristics. In this respect using Canadian data makes sense 
as there exists available information across provinces and over time without significant 
gaps, unlike U.S. data. We also estimate the effects of beer prices and the minimum legal 
                                                 
33 For example please see Cunningham et al. (2002).    29
drinking age on teen childbearing and pregnancies. Finally, we employ survey data to 
confirm whether higher alcohol consumption is correlated with having multiple partners 
and the incidence of STDs. 
  Our results suggest that higher beer prices are significantly correlated with lower 
gonorrhea and chlamydia rates and beer price elasticities within the range of -0.6 to -1.4. 
Further, we confirm that estimating the effects of beer taxes on STDs might not be the 
best methodology as we obtain rather conflicting results. However, beer prices do not 
have any statistically significant impact on either teen births or pregnancies. In contrast, 
both OLS and IV estimates suggest that an increase in the minimum legal drinking age is 
significantly associated with lower teen births and pregnancies. Finally, results from the 
1996 NPHS confirm that higher alcohol consumption is indeed correlated with an 
increased likelihood of having multiple partners and ultimately a STD, even after 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 N  MEAN STD  DEV MIN MAX 
A. Cross Province 
Time-Series Data    
Total Gonorrhea Rate  180  71.448 86.653 1.00E-08 467.3 
Male Gonorrhea Rate  180  78.453 101.92 1.00E-08 554.6 
Female Gonorrhea Rate  180  61.154 73.792 1.00E-08 384.5 
Real Beer Price (per 
Litre) 180  2.6305 0.40993 1.5292 3.5774 
Real Per Capita Income  180  14407 3025.7 7452 20987 
Real Per Capita 
Government Health 
Expenditures 180  14.94 1.4997 11.212 17.986 
Number of Physicians 
Per 100,000 of 
Population 180  165.12 25.287 115.08 209.58 
Real Excise Taxes Per 2 
Cigarettes 180  0.21961 8.78E-02 5.31E-02 0.42905 
Minimum Legal Drinking 
Age 180  0.66667 0.47272 0 1 
Teen Pregnancies Per 
1,000 of women 15-19  180  39.392 8.8381 22.2 59 
Teen Fertility Per 1,000 
of women 15-19  180  29.699 9.0294 14.2 50.2 
Total Chlamydia Rate  90  151.86 72.245 1.00E-08 410.2 
Male Chlamydia Rate  90  73.069 43.529 0 220.5 
Female Chlamydia Rate  90  220.91 107.39 0 596.7 
    
B. 1996 NPHS Survey    
    
Male 11431  0.511941 0.499879 0 1 
age 20-24;  11431  0.135246 0.342001 0 1 
age 25-29  11431  0.240574 0.427451 0 1 
age 30-34  11431  0.183711 0.387265 0 1 
age 35-39  11431  0.145307 0.352425 0 1 
age 40-44  11431  0.127198 0.333209 0 1 
age 45-49  11431  0.097542 0.296707 0 1 
age 50-54  11431  0.070423 0.255869 0 1 
high school  11431  0.190272 0.392533 0 1 
college   11431  0.172688 0.377994 0 1 
Some college   11431  0.186598 0.389605 0 1   34
undergraduate 11431  0.191059 0.393153 0 1 
graduate 11431  0.256408 0.436669 0 1 
Income less than 5000  11431  0.01006 0.0998 0 1 
Income 5,000-9999  11431  0.051264 0.220546 0 1 
Income 10000-14999  11431  0.088881 0.284585 0 1 
Income 15000-19999  11431  0.076109 0.265184 0 1 
Income 20000-29999  11431  0.121687 0.326938 0 1 
Income 30000-39999  11431  0.131572 0.33804 0 1 
Income 40-49999  11431  0.131572 0.33804 0 1 
Income 50-5999  11431  0.101216 0.301628 0 1 
Income 60-7999  11431  0.085294 0.279332 0 1 
Income greater than 
80000 
11431 0.073047 0.260225 0 1 
Have you broken speed 
limit 
11431 0.589275 0.491987 0 1 
Number of times driven 
while impaired in past 
year 
11431 0.465664 2.570719 0 99 
Number of average daily 
drinks 
11431 0.657773 1.340506 0 24 
Number of average daily 
drinks Squared  
11431 2.229464 13.02277 0 576 
Had more than one 
sexual partner in past 
year 
11431 0.204444 0.403312 0 1 
Has a sexually 
transmitted disease 
11431 0.028869 0.167445 0 1 
Number of years been a 
daily smoker 
11431 6.825387 9.038846 0 42 
Number of years been a 
daily smoker squared 
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the impact of beer prices on gonorrhea rates (1981-99) 
34 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
A. Total        
Beer prices  -21.076      
(8.8056)
 a 35 
-28.444      
(9.2404)
 a 
-22.705      
(7.8518)
 a 
-24.589      
(8.6683)
 a 
Elasticity [-0.776]    [-1.0472]  [-0.8359]  [-0.90529] 
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate  0.74494     
(0.06717)
a 
0.40503     
(0.07931)
 a 
0.40954     
(0.0789)
 a 
  0.38819     
(0.08350)
 a 
Minimum Legal Drinking Age      3.4096      
(11.013) 
1.7477      
(11.766) 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cigarette Prices, Real Per Capita Government 
Health Expenditures, Number of Physicians Per 
Capita of Population 
No No  No  Yes   
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9798  0.9826  0.9828  0.9827 
Observations 180  180  180  180 
B. Male        
Beer prices  -23.942      
(10.384)
 a 
-29.014      
(10.268)
 a 
-23.447      
(9.4129)
 a 
-26.135      
(10.167)
 a 
Elasticity [-0.803]    [-0.9728]  [-0.7861]  [-0.8763] 
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate  0.77750     
(0.0600)
 a 
0.52908     
(0.08616)
 a 
  0.52426    
(0.0858)
 a 
0.51151     
(0.08640)
 a 
Minimum Legal Drinking Age      5.1527      
(11.812) 
-0.93617      
(13.388) 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cigarette Prices, Real Per Capita Government 
Health Expenditures, Number of Physicians Per 
Capita of Population 
No No  No  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9827  0.9844  0.9845  0.9844 
Observations 180  180  180  180 
B. Female        
Beer prices  -15.777      
(8.1044)
 c 
-23.694      
(8.3031)
 a 
-20.023      
(7.8094)
 a 
-19.593      
(8.2348)
 a 
Elasticity [-0.679]    [-1.0192]  [-0.8613]  [-0.8428] 
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate    0.74902     
(0.05718)
 a 
0.34520     
(0.06936)
 a 
  0.36046    
(0.0725)
 a 
0.35817     
(0.07568)
 a 
                                                 
34 The data are for 10 provinces between 1981 and 1999. Standard errors are White corrected for 
heterosckedasticity and Newey – West corrected for autocorrelation. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
elasticities in square brackets.  
 
35 a, b, c refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   36
 
Minimum Legal Drinking Age 
    
6.5469      
(11.964) 
 
7.5622      
(13.014) 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cigarette Prices, Real Per Capita Government 
Health Expenditures, Number of Physicians Per 
Capita of Population 
No No  No  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9742    0.9794  0.9177  0.9788 
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A. Total      
Beer prices  -39.615      
(15.912)
 b 
-44.195      
(16.561)
a 
-62.417      
(15.950)
 a 37 
Elasticity [-0.7235]  [-0.807]    [-1.1400] 
Lagged Chlamydia Rate  -0.42501     
(0.07475)
 a 
-0.46187     
(0.06445)
 a 
-0.43082     
(0.05331)
 a 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  No  Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9179  0.9325  0.9541 
Observations 90  90  90 
B. Male      
Beer prices  -20.685      
(11.325)
 c 
-18.347      
(11.338) 
-36.924      
(11.403)
 a 
Elasticity [-0.7850]  [-0.6964]  [-1.4015] 
Lagged Chlamydia Rate  -0.39049     
(0.0766)
 a 
  -0.42603     
(0.08105)
 a 
  -0.39408     
(0.05931)
 a 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  No  Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  No  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.8821  0.8851  0.9344 
Observations 90  90  90 
B. Female      
Beer prices  -63.424      
(33.525)
 c 
-65.392      
(32.407)
 b 
-76.985      
(28.647)
 a 
Elasticity [-0.7962]  [-0.821]    [-0.96654] 
Lagged Chlamydia Rate  -0.38470     
(0.08372)
 a 
  -0.43010     
(0.08392)
 a 
-0.49723     
(0.05570)
 a 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  No  Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  No  No  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.7785  0.8006  0.9009 
Observations 90  90  90 
 
 
                                                 
36 The data are for 10 provinces between 1991 and 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses and elasticities 
in square brackets. Standard errors of OLS estimates are White corrected for heterosckedasticity and 
Newey – West corrected for autocorrelation. 
 
37 a, b, c refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   38








A. Gonorrhea      
Beer Taxes  86.521      
(51.290)
 c 39 
121.57      
(60.395)
 b 
56.152      
(48.752)
  
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate  0.40149     
(0.08618)
a 
0.49747     
(0.10195)
 a 
0.38658     
(0.07207)
 a 
Minimum Legal Drinking Age  4.3172      
(11.668)   
-5.7543      
(14.794) 
14.308      
(11.992) 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cigarette Prices, Real Per Capita Government Health 
Expenditures, Number of Physicians Per Capita of 
Population 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9822  0.9818  0.9795 
Observations 180  180  180 
      
B. Chlamydia      
Beer Taxes   -174.94      
(111.08)
 c 
-228.43      
(73.700)
 a 
-544.47      
(225.61)
 b 
Elasticity [-3.195]    [-8.6607]  [-6.8347] 
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate  -0.44778     
(0.05315)
 a 
-0.40898     
(0.05565)
 a 
  -0.50531     
(0.05324)
 a 
Unemployment Rate and Per Capita Income  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Linear Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Quadratic Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9489  0.9337  0.9017 
      










                                                 
38 The data are for 10 provinces between 1981 and 1999. Standard errors are White corrected for 
heterosckedasticity and Newey – West corrected for autocorrelation. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
elasticities in square brackets.  
 
39 a, b, c refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   39
Table 5: IV estimates of the impact of beer prices on gonorrhea and chlamydia rates 
(1986-99)
40 



















rates in panels 



















































rates in panels 






A. Gonorrhea           
Beer prices    -11.645      
(16.959)
  
  -22.067      
(15.070)
 c 
  -11.136      
(12.778)
  
Elasticity   [-0.7402]    [-1.323]    [-0.7725] 
Lagged Gonorrhea Rate    1.3349     
(0.66243)
 a41 
  0.99755     
(0.46990)
b 
  0.88682     
(0.61840)
 b 
Minimum Legal Drinking 
Age 
  21.266      
(27.094) 
  8.5929      
(23.028) 
  7.5183      
(22.635) 
Lagged Beer Tax (in $)   -23.245       
(36.723)
  
  -61.525      
(52.005) 
  -50.776      
(45.713) 
 
            
Lagged Beer Tax (in $) * 
Liberal Party 
0.11426       
(14.687) 
  16.160      
(20.141) 
  12.497      
(16.695) 
 
            
Lagged Beer Tax (in $) * 
New Democratic Party  
-45.167    
   (24.344)
 c 
  -46.685      
(26.873)
 c 
  -27.819      
(23.354) 
 
           
P Value of F- Test of joint 
significance of Lagged 
Beer Tax, Lagged Beer 
Tax * Liberal Party, 
Lagged Beer Tax * New 
Democratic Party 
0.27488   0.14234    0.22887   
            
Minimum Legal Drinking 
Age, Real Beer Prices, 
Unemployment Rate and 
Per Capita Income 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
            
Year Fixed Effects, 
Province Linear Trends, 
Province Quadratic Trends 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9767  0.9594  0.9722  0.9486  0.9701  0.9438 
Observations 140  140  140  140  140  140 
           
                                                 
40 The data are for 10 provinces between 1986 and 1999 for panel A and from 1991 to 1999 for panel B. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and elasticities in square brackets.  
 
41 a, b, c refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   40
B. Chlamydia           
Beer prices      -68.576      
(28.902)
 b 
  -34.318      
(18.891)
 c 
  -110.79      
(78.308)
 c 
Elasticity   [-1.252]    [-1.303]    [-1.391] 
Lagged Chlamydia Rate    -0.31229     
(0.28766)
  





Lagged Beer Tax (in $)  -572.41 
(217.30)
b 
  -455.38      
(141.01)
a 




            
Lagged Beer Tax (in $) * 
Liberal Party 
36.291      
(67.395) 
  53.851      
(43.287) 
  74.186      
(120.81) 
 
            
Lagged Beer Tax (in $) * 
New Democratic Party 
41.791      
(150.43) 
  -0.51625      
(98.381) 
  27.525      
(297.02) 
 
           
P Value of F- Test of joint 
significance of Lagged 
Beer Tax, Lagged Beer 
Tax * Liberal Party, 
Lagged Beer Tax * New 
Democratic Party 
0.01819   0.00438    0.01601   
            
Real Beer Prices, 
Unemployment Rate and 
Per Capita Income 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
            
Year Fixed Effects, 
Province Linear Trends, 
Province Quadratic Trends 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.7759  0.9498  0.7223  0.9315  0.6704  0.8276 
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A. Teen Pregnancies Per 1,000 
women under 20 years 
     
Beer prices  8.4859      
(1.9703)
 a 
1.7928      
(1.1123) 
8.7979      
(3.1333)
 b l 
-1.8442       
(2.4300)
  
Minimum Legal Drinking Age    -9.0556      
(1.7866)
 a 
-3.2924      
(1.7202)
 b 
-7.2183      
(2.6033)
 a 
-0.76792      
(2.2711)
  
Average Government Transfers to 











Unemployment Rate and Per Capita 
Income 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Specific Linear Trends  No  Yes  No  No 
Adjusted R Square   0.9034  0.9709  0.9221  0.9396 
Observations 180  180  140  140 
B. Teen Births Per 1,000 women 
under 20 years 
     
Lagged Beer prices  5.6982      
(1.0489)
 a 
1.1278     
(0.97193) 
5.3670      
(1.4625)
 a  
-0.24536      
(1.6286)
  
Lagged Minimum Legal Drinking Age  -10.407      
(1.3120)
 a 
-4.8584      
(1.6653)
 a 
-7.0458      
(1.3730)
 a 
-2.8227       
(1.6292)
 c 
Lagged Average Government 













Unemployment Rate and Per Capita 
Income 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Specific Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.9527  0.9767  0.9485  0.9618 











                                                 
42 The data are for 10 provinces between 1981 and 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses and elasticities 
in square brackets. Standard errors of OLS estimates are White corrected for heterosckedasticity and 
Newey – West corrected for autocorrelation. 
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to 4 drinks 
daily 
between 5 
to 9 drinks 
daily 
10 or more 
drinks daily   
multiple partners  0.158931             0.278564       0.412844               0.448276 
  
has a STD  0.026737             0.032233        0.04128                0.034483 
  
has broken speed 
limits 
0.608442             0.562631        0.426606              0.448276 
  
number of times 
driven impaired 
0.163409              0.87631          3.385321              1.275862 
 
  
number of years as 
daily smoker 
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Table 8: OLS estimates of the impact of alcohol consumption on possessing multiple 





































A. All ages        
Possessing 
multiple partners 
      0.02856    
(0.00418)
 a 





0.07126    
(0.01406)
 a 44 
0.06463   
0.01363)
 a 







-0.00327    
(0.00061)
a 
-0.002947    
(0.000583)
 a 




Number of years 
as daily smoker 




Number of years 
as daily smoker- 
squared 




If regularly breaks 
speed limits 
  -0.04059    
(0.0072)
 a 




Drinks and drives    0.009035    
(0.00128)
 a 




Male  0.07777    
(0.0202)
 a 
0.07435    
(0.02044)
 a 
0.07588   
(0.02067)
 a 
-0.01316    
(0.00158)
 a    
-0.0121    
(0.00323)
 a 
P Value of F- Test 
of joint significance 
of Number of years 
as daily smoker, 
Number of years as 
daily smoker- 
squared, If regularly 
breaks speed limits,  
Drinks and drives 
     0.00000 
          
Income fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Education fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Age fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.09679  0.1024  0.1044  0.01165  0.01165 
Observations 11,431  11,431  11,431 11,431  11,431 
        
                                                 
43 The data are for 10 provinces and consists of 11,431 observations for all ages and 1,546 observations 
with respect to teens. Standard errors are clustered by province and are in parentheses.   
 
44 a, b, c refers to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   44
B.  Teen        
Possessing 
multiple partners 
      0.02248    
(0.00957)
 a 





0.07022    
(0.01760)
 a 
0.06264    
(0.01660)
 a 







-0.00311    
(0.00077) 
-0.00277    
(0.00077) 




Number of years 
as daily smoker 
    0.05239    
(0.012982) 
  
Number of years 
as daily smoker- 
squared 
    -0.0049861    
(0.00158) 
  
If regularly breaks 
speed limits 
  -0.0020    
(0.02692) 
0.00954    
(0.02557) 
  
Drinks and drives    0.01080    
(0.00153) 
0.01048    
(0.00158) 
  
Male  0.0430838    
(0.015819) 
0.04143    
(0.016496) 
0.050687    
(0.01736) 
-0.011620    
(0.00820) 
-0.01162    
(0.00745) 
P Value of F- Test 
of joint significance 
of Number of years 
as daily smoker, 
Number of years as 
daily smoker- 
squared, If regularly 
breaks speed limits,  
Drinks and drives 
     0.00000 
          
Income fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Education fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square   0.1146  0.1190  0.1343  0.0217  0.02172 
Observations 1,546  1,546  1,546  1,546  1,546 
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